We study the coordination of production decisions for multiple products among many manufacturers and many suppliers, each with private information about its own objective and its own production capabilities.
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Introduction
We study the coordination of production decisions for multiple products among many decision makers each with private information about its own objective and its own production capabilities.
We propose a constructive proof for the existence of Nash equilibria whose outcome is that of the centralized system. This proof requires no assumptions on the distributions of beliefs of each decision maker regarding asymmetric information.
One motivation for our research is the problem of supply chain coordination. If multiple suppliers and manufacturers, each with private information, are involved in the trade of products, they can agree a priori on the rules for allocation of orders and determination of prices. We provide such rules and prove that strategic (competitive) suppliers and buyers voluntarily participate and follow such rules, and achieve optimal trade of products.
Another motivation for our research is the coordination of cross-functional decisions within a firm. Division managers of a large corporation (e.g. GE, GM, Apple) may have objectives that are not aligned with those of the corporation and, by acting selfishly, they could harm the corporation overall. The top corporate management would like to introduce the rules for allocation of orders and profits among the divisions so that the strategic division managers voluntarily follow these rules, the sum of the objectives of all divisions is maximized and the value for the corporation's shareholders is maximized.
The coordination problem has been studied extensively in the economics, operations management, and other fields and a number of solutions to this problem have been suggested. Because none of the solutions is the definitive one, the choice of the best solution depends on the particular problem. In this paper we describe what we believe to be a good solution to a large-scale, multi-product, production-coordination problem, where many decision makers have very limited information about each other and no one has a dominant position. The following is a review of other alternatives for solving this type of coordination problem.
The naive solution approach to the coordination problem is to ask the decision makers to share their private information and then act in the interest of the centralized system. However, without 4 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no. market maker who determines the unit price at which the output of the manufacturing divisions is sold to the internal market and the unit prices at which each of the distribution divisions can buy products from the internal markets. To ensure participation of all divisions lump-sum side payments are used to redistribute the system profit. All contracting takes place at time 0. The authors show how the principal should set the prices of the internal market to induce actions from each division manager that would be optimal for the centralized system.
Our model considers a general setting with many firms. It also applies to the case of a single firm where the planner's objective is to maximize the sum of utilities of the firm's divisions (supply and manufacturing divisions or manufacturing and distribution divisions). The approach we present in this paper is game theoretic where each firm is considered to be a self utility maximizer.
We formulate the supply-chain problem as a market problem of private goods exchange between suppliers and manufacturers and investigate it within the framework of implementation theory (Williams (2008) , Hurwicz and Reiter (2006) , Palfrey (2002) , Maskin and Sjostrom (2002), Maskin (1985) , Jackson (2001) ). Previous works on Nash implementation for private goods and Walrasian economies can be found in Hammond (1979) , Hurwicz (1979) , Schmeidler (1980) , Hurwicz and Schmeidler (1975) . For our work, we obtained inspiration from Hurwicz (1979) . In the above paper Hurwicz presents a Nash implementation mechanism for pure exchange economies where firms can trade by exchanging products with any other firm. In return of the product exchange, each firm makes/receives a payment which induces it to trade quantities that maximize the social welfare. In this paper we consider a supply-chain system which consists of two types of firms: Suppliers who only supply products and receive money for it, and manufacturers who only purchase products and pay money for it. Because of these constraints on the exchange of products and money among the firms, the supply-chain model and hence the supply-chain coordination problem we consider in this paper is different from the pure exchange economy model and the decision problem addressed in Hurwicz (1979) . We consider a supply-chain consisting of selfish suppliers and manufacturers, where each supplier has a production capacity constraint and each supplier/manufacturer obtains a utility by supplying/purchasing products. For this model we investigate a supply-chain coordination Sharma et al.: Nash implementation of optimal trade in a supply-chain Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
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problem that aims at determining the supply quantities, purchase quantities, and corresponding payments that, (i) satisfy the suppliers' capacity constraints; (ii) balance the net supply and net purchase; (iii) balance the net payment made by the manufacturers and the net payment received by the suppliers; and (iv) maximize the sum of utilities of all suppliers and manufacturers (social welfare). We present a decentralized mechanism for the above problem that induces all suppliers and manufacturers to voluntarily participate in the mechanism, and induces a game among the suppliers and manufacturers such that the abovementioned objectives (i)-(iv) are achieved at all Nash equilibria of the induced game.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we describe the supply-chain model and present an equivalent centralized supply-chain problem. In Section 3.1 we model the supplychain problem in the framework of implementation theory. In Section 3.2 we present a game form (decentralized mechanism) which induces a game such that all Nash equilibrium outcomes of the game are solutions of the centralized supply-chain problem. For convenience, the proofs of all theorems and results are presented in appendices. We conclude in Section 4.
Before we present the model in Section 2, we describe here the notation that we will use throughout the paper.
Notation:
We use bold font to represent vectors as opposed to scalars. The elements of a vector are represented by a subscript on the vector symbol. A bold subscripted-symbol means that the vector element is also a vector; e.g. in x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N ), each x i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, is a vector; and in x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x N ), each x i , i = 1, 2, . . . , N, is a scalar. Unless otherwise stated, all vectors are treated as column vectors. Bold 0 is treated as a zero vector of appropriate size determined by the context. The notation (x i , x * /i) (or (x i , x * /i)) is used to represent the following: (
is a vector of dimension same as that of x * ; the ith element of (
, all other elements of it are the same as the corresponding elements of x * . We represent a diagonal matrix of size N × N whose diagonal entries are elements of the vector x ∈ R N by diag(x).
Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
The supply-chain problem
The model (M1)
We consider a supply chain consisting of N M manufacturers and N S suppliers where either N M ≥ 2 or N S ≥ 2 or both. We denote the manufacturers by j ∈ N M := {1, 2, . . . , N M }, and the suppliers by i ∈ N S := {1, 2, . . . , N S }. The suppliers provide products to the manufacturers and the manufacturers either sell these products to the retailers or use them to produce new products. We assume that there are L different types of products and we denote the set of products by L := {1, 2, . . . , L}.
Furthermore, each of the suppliers can supply some non-strict subset of the L types of products and each of the manufacturers wishes to buy some non-strict subset of the L products. We represent the bundle of L products supplied by supplier i, i ∈ N S , by the vector
, and the bundle of L products purchased by manufacturer j, j ∈ N M , by the vector y j := (y j 1 , y j 2 , . . . , y j L ).
We assume that x i ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ N S , and y j ≥ 0 ∀ j ∈ N M . We also assume that each supplier i ∈ N S has a capacity constraint on the product quantity it can supply given by,
where
, and for each i ∈ N S , n i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , L}. The matrix A i accounts for the substitution effects or flexible production capacity among the L products supplied by supplier i. These effects may arise because of the infrastructure constraints affecting simultaneous/parallel production or storage of the products supplied by supplier i. For each of the n i bundles consisting of products that are linked due to substitution/flexibility effects, the capacity constraint of the net bundle supply by supplier i is given by the corresponding element in vector b i . We assume that, Assumption 1 For each i ∈ N S , the matrix A i and the vector b i are supplier i's private information, i.e., this information is known only to supplier i and nobody else in the system.
As discussed above, in this paper we assume linear capacity constraints for suppliers, and no constraints on the purchase capacities of manufacturers. We make both these assumptions for simplicity of presentation. We would like to emphasize that the mechanism proposed in this paper Sharma et al.: Nash implementation of optimal trade in a supply-chain Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
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can as well be used for models where the suppliers have any convex production capacity constraints, and the manufacturers have any convex purchase capacity constraints. Furthermore, all the results of this paper can be extended to these more general models.
We denote the payment vector from the manufacturers to the suppliers supplying their products
, where g j ∈ R + is the total payment given by manufacturer j, j ∈ N M , to all the suppliers, and r i ∈ R + is the total payment received by supplier i, i ∈ N S , from all the manufacturers.
We denote the set of feasible transactions for supplier i, i ∈ N S , by D S i which is defined as follows,
Assumption 1 implies that the set D S i is user i's private knowledge. Because a manufacturer does not have any constraint associated with its purchase, the set of feasible transactions for manufacturer j, j ∈ N M , is defined as,
There is a manager who governs the transaction between the suppliers and the manufacturers according to an allocation mechanism. The allocation mechanism specifies the supply amounts x i , i ∈ N S , the purchase amounts y j , j ∈ N M , and the payment vector (g, r). It is important that a transaction does not lead to unclaimed products or money (not allocated to/claimed by any supplier or manufacturer) in the system. To avoid this, the allocation mechanism that determines the transaction must ensure that,
and Every manufacturer or supplier has a preference associated with the trade of the products and the corresponding monetary exchange. Supplier i's, i ∈ N S , preference is quantified by a utility function u
In ( Furthermore, the function c i is supplier i's private knowledge.
The preference of manufacturer j, j ∈ N M , is quantified by a utility function u
In (7) v j (y j ) is the value manufacturer j obtains by making a purchase y j , y j ∈ D M j , from the suppliers. We assume that, Assumption 3 For each j ∈ N M , the function v j is strictly concave in y j with v j (0) = 0 and
The assumptions of convex costs and concave values are standard in the operations research literature. In this paper we assume strict convexity of c i , i ∈ N S , and strict concavity of v j , j ∈ N M ; such an assumption implies that there is a unique optimal supply-purchase vector for the supplychain problem we formulate in Section 2.2. We highlight the important fact that all the results of this paper would also hold for any non strictly convex c i , i ∈ N S , and any non strictly concave v j , j ∈ N M . However, in the absence of strict convexity/concavity there may be multiple optimal supply-purchase vectors; hence, different Nash equilibria of the game induced by the mechanism proposed in Section 3.2 may result in different optimal supply-purchase vectors (nevertheless all Sharma et al.: Nash implementation of optimal trade in a supply-chain Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
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Nash equilibria will result in optimal supply-purchase vectors). The assumption of non negative gradients of manufacturers' value functions allows our model to include some well known examples of value functions such as the newsvendor value function.
1
We assume that the preference of all the suppliers and manufacturers, in particular,
, and v j ∀ j ∈ N M , remain unchanged for the period of the settlement and implementation of the deal between the manufacturers and the suppliers.
Furthermore, we assume that all manufacturers and suppliers are selfish, i.e., they are all self utility maximizers. On the other hand the manager that governs the transaction between the suppliers and the manufacturers does not have any utility. It simply acts like an accountant that facilitates the transfer of products/money between the suppliers and manufacturers.
In the following section we formulate the problem of optimal transaction determination for the supply-chain model (M1).
The decentralized Supply-Chain (SC) problem
For the supply-chain model (M1) we want to develop a mechanism for determining the amount of supplies, purchases and the corresponding payments that works under the decentralized information setting of the model and obtains a solution to the following centralized problem:
s.t.
and i∈N S
By substituting the utility functions u S i and u M j from (6) and (7), Problem (P C ) becomes equivalent to, Sharma et al.: Nash implementation of optimal trade in a supply-chain
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where,
The optimization problem (11) is equivalent to (8) because for (g, r, x, y) / ∈ D, the objective function in (8) is negative infinity by (6) and (7). Thus D is the set of feasible solutions of Problem (P C ).
Because of Assumptions 2 and 3, the objective function in (11) is strictly concave in (x, y). Therefore, there is a unique optimal supply-purchase vector (x * , y * ) for Problem (P C ). Furthermore, since the objective function in (11) does not explicitly depend on (g, r), an optimal solution of Problem (P C ) must be of the form (g, r, x * , y * ), where (g, r) is any feasible payment vector, i.e.
and j∈N M g j = i∈N S r i .
Discussion
As described in Section 2.1, in the decentralized supply-chain model (M1) none of the firms (suppliers or manufacturers) or the manager who governs the transaction between the firms has complete information to solve Problem (P C ) (Assumptions 1, 2, 3). Therefore, we must develop an allocation mechanism that enables the firms and the manager to determine optimal solutions of Problem (P C ) via some communication with one another. Since the firms are assumed to be selfish, such a mechanism must be robust to the selfish communication strategies of the firms.
A systematic approach to the development of resource allocation mechanisms for informationally decentralized systems where individuals behave strategically, is provided by implementation theory in Mathematical Economics. In the context of the SC problem, implementation theory can provide guidelines for designing mechanisms that specify rules on: (i) how the firms should "communicate"
with one another and the manager, and (ii) how "the information communicated by the firms must be used" to determine supply/purchase quantities and corresponding payments so as to induce the selfish firms to communicate information that results in a system objective maximizing transaction.
In this paper we use an implementation theory-based approach for the solution of the SC problem presented in this section. Therefore, in the next section we provide a brief introduction to implementation theory and set the preliminaries for our solution to the SC problem.
3. Solution of the SC problem 3.1. Embedding the SC problem for Model (M1) in the framework of implementation theory
In the implementation theory framework, a resource allocation problem is described by the triple (E, A, π): the environment space E, the action/allocation space A and the goal correspondence π.
The environment e of a resource allocation problem is the set of infrastructure available to all the individuals, their utilities, and any other information available to them, taken together.
2
For the SC problem, the environment e , and those of all suppliers and manufacturers collectively define the environment space E :=
The action space A is the set of all resource allocations / transactions that are feasible in the system. For the SC problem, A = D.
The goal correspondence π is a mapping from E to A which maps each environment e ∈ E, to the set of actions π(e) in A that are optimal according to some pre-specified system objective. For the SC problem (P C ), the system objective is the maximization of the sum utilities i∈N S u
In a centralized system a central agent who completely knows e can determine the optimal transactions π(e) ∈ A by mathematical optimization methods.
On the other hand, in the supply-chain model (M1), which is a decentralized system, none of the 12 Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
firms (suppliers or manufacturers) or the manager completely knows e. Therefore, it is not possible for anyone to determine optimal centralized transactions, π(e), without some communication with one another. If the firms are selfish, they have an incentive to misrepresent their private information while communicating with one another so as to shift the transaction determined by the allocation mechanism in their own favor. The firms may also choose not to participate in the communication process if they know that the resulting transaction will make them worse off. Such a strategic behavior of firms may defeat the goal of maximizing the system objective. Therefore, for the success of a decentralized mechanism (in leading to desirable transactions) it is required that the mechanism induces the firms to, (i) voluntarily participate in the communication and allocation process, and
(ii) communicate information that results in system objective maximizing transactions. The design of such decentralized mechanisms is addressed by implementation theory as described next.
In implementation theory a decentralized resource allocation mechanism is formally described by
is the message space which specifies for each supplier i ∈ N S and each manufacturer j ∈ N M , the set of messages M 
, the resulting transaction f (m) ∈ A. The game form is assumed to be known to all the firms so they can participate in the decentralized mechanism.
The firms' strategic behavior in such a mechanism is modeled by specifying games. A game
In this game the firms i ∈ N S and j ∈ N M are the players, the
is the set of (communication) strategies of player i, i ∈ N S (respectively j, j ∈ N M ), and u
resulting from the strategy/message profile m. A game analysis is useful if the game leads to some equilibrium in the firms' strategic behavior specified by various solution/equilibrium concepts. One such solution concept is Nash Equilibrium (NE) which is defined as a message profile m * such that,
Sharma et al.: Nash implementation of optimal trade in a supply-chain Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
13
We desire for the equilibria obtained from a game to result in optimal centralized solutions (solutions of Problem (P C ) for the SC problem). To formally define this requirement, let us first represent the set of all Nash equilibria of the game (M, f, {u
that is, A N E is the set of transactions corresponding to all Nash equilibria of the game. Having defined A N E we use it to define the notion of implementation in Nash equilibria.
Definition 1
Implementation in Nash equilibria: A goal correspondence π is said to be "implemented in Nash equilibria" by the game form
Definition 1 says that when π is implemented by (M, f ), then, for any given environment e = (e S i ) i∈N S , (e M j ) j∈N M of the decentralized problem, the set of transactions resulting from the Nash equilibria (through the outcome function f ) of the game (M, f, {u
is a subset of the set of optimal centralized transactions π(e) corresponding to the problem specified by (e, A, π).
For a game form to implement a goal correspondence in NE, it is required that the firms participate in the communication process specified by the game form. In order that the firms voluntarily participate in this communication process, the game form must satisfy an additional property known as individual rationality. Let the initial endowment of a firm be defined as the amount of resources the firm has before participating in a game form. In the SC model (M1), the initial endowment f S i 0 of suppliers i, i ∈ N S , and f M j 0 of manufacturers j, j ∈ N M , are the amount of products and money they have before the transaction, i.e., f
Definition 2
Individual rationality: A game form (M, f ) is said to be individually rational if,
Definition 2 says that, at any NE transaction the utility of every firm is at least as much as its utility without participating in the game form. Thus, an individually rational game form makes sure that a firm finds it beneficial to participate if other firms also participate in the game form.
For the SC problem, this condition in particular implies that a supplier (respectively manufacturer)
benefits from participation in the game form if at least two manufacturers (respectively suppliers) participate, or at least one other supplier and manufacturer participate. Thus, under above conditions, every firm voluntarily participates in the game form.
In the sequel, we ensure that the desirable properties of implementation in Nash equilibria and individual rationality made precise in Definitions 1 and 2 are achieved in our design of the decentralized mechanism for the SC problem presented in Section 2.2. More precisely, our goal is:
The goal:
To design an individually rational, budget balanced and product balanced game form (M, f )
for the SC problem presented in Section 2.2 that implements in NE the goal correspondence π corresponding to Problem (P C ).
It is important to clarify the rationale behind choosing NE as the solution concept for the SC problem. Note that because of assumptions 1, 2 and 3 in Model (M1), the environment of the SC problem is one of incomplete information. Therefore, one may speculate the use of Bayesian Nash or dominant strategy as appropriate solution concepts for this problem. However, because the firms in Model (M1) do not possess any prior beliefs about the utility functions and capacity constraints of other firms, we cannot use Bayesian Nash as a solution concept for Model (M1).
Furthermore, because of impossibility results for the existence of non-parametric efficient dominant strategy mechanisms in classical private good environments (Groves and Ledyard (1987) ), we Sharma et al.: Nash implementation of optimal trade in a supply-chain Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
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do not know if it is possible to design such mechanisms for Model (M1) that has characteristics similar to private goods environments. The well known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms that achieve incentive compatibility and efficiency with respect to non-numeraire goods, do not guarantee budget balance (Groves and Ledyard (1987) ). Hence, they are inappropriate for our SC problem as budget balance is one of the desirable properties in this problem. VCG mechanisms are also unsuitable for our SC problem because they are direct mechanisms (Groves and Ledyard (1987) , Hurwicz and Reiter (2006) ) and require infinite message space to communicate the generic continuous (and concave) utility functions of firms in Model (M1). For the above reasons, and the known existence results for non-parametric, individually rational, budget-balanced Nash implementation mechanisms for classical private goods environments (Groves and Ledyard (1987) ), we choose Nash as the solution concept for our SC problem.
We would also like to clarify the interpretation of NE in the context of our SC problem. Note that NE in general describe the strategic behavior of individuals in games of complete information.
This can be seen from (12) where, to define NE, it requires complete information of all firms' utility functions. Because the firms in Model (M1) do not know each other's utilities, for any profile of the firms' utilities the resulting game is not one of complete information. Therefore, to use NE as the solution concept for our SC problem, we adopt the interpretation of Reichelstein and Reiter (1988) and (Groves and Ledyard 1987, Section 4) . Specifically, by quoting (Reichelstein and Reiter 1988, page 664), "we interpret our analysis as applying to an unspecified (message exchange) process in which firms grope their way to a stationary message and in which the Nash property (12) is a necessary condition for stationarity." Alternatively, by quoting (Groves and Ledyard 1987, Section 4, page 69), "we do not suggest that each firm knows all of system environment when it computes its message. We do suggest, however, that the complete information Nash game-theoretic equilibrium messages may be the possible stationary messages of some unspecified dynamic message exchange process."
In the next section we present a game form for the SC problem that achieves the abovementioned desirable properties of Nash implementation, individual rationality, and budget balance.
A game form for the SC problem
In this section we present a game form for the SC problem, and we specify its elements, the message space and the outcome function.
The message space:
Since we are interested in determining the quantities of supply and purchase and the payments for the firms in SC, the communication among the firms and the manager should contain information that is helpful in determining the optimal amounts of each of these. Each supplier i ∈ N S broadcasts to the system (including the manager and other firms) a message m
+ of the following form:
The two elements of message m S i are:
, which can be interpreted as the amount of each of the L products that supplier i, i ∈ N S , proposes to supply to the manufacturers, and p
, which can be interpreted as the unit price proposed by supplier i, i ∈ N S , for each of the L products.
Similarly, each manufacturer j ∈ N M broadcasts to the system (including the manager and other
The two elements of message m M j are: y j = (y j 1 , y j 2 , . . . , y j L ), which can be interpreted as the amount of each of the L products that the manufacturer j, j ∈ N M , proposes to purchase from the suppliers, and p
), which can be interpreted as the unit price proposed by manufacturer j, j ∈ N M , for each of the L products.
Outcome function:
Before we present the outcome function for the SC problem, we would like to emphasize that the specification of the outcome function, in particular the payment function, is the most important and challenging task in the construction of a game form. Since the designer of the mechanism cannot Sharma et al.: Nash implementation of optimal trade in a supply-chain Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
17
alter the firms' utility functions u S i , i ∈ N S , and u M j , j ∈ N M , the only way it can achieve the desirable properties of Nash implementation, individual rationality and budget balance is through the provision of appropriate payments/incentives that induce strategic firms to follow the mechanism's operational rules.
For the SC problem the outcomes are determined (by the manager or the firms themselves) based on the broadcast message profile m = ((m
We designate the outcomes with a "hat": the supply quantityx i , i ∈ N S , the purchase quantityŷ j , j ∈ N M , the total paymentr i received by supplier i ∈ N S , and the total paymentĝ j made by manufacturer j ∈ N M . The outcome function is given below:
where p
The game form defined by (17)- (24) together with the firms' utility functions in (6) and (7) induces a game. The strategy of supplier i, i ∈ N S , (respectively manufacturer j, j ∈ N M ,) in this game is its message m Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
We next establish that the above game form possesses the properties of Nash implementation, individual rationality, and budget balance. We first provide an intuitive explanation on how the structure of the above game form leads to achieving these properties; then, we present theorems that formalize the results.
Intuition behind the construction of the game form
As stated above, we want to establish three properties of the game form: (i) Nash implementation;
(ii) individual rationality; and (iii) budget balance. We begin with a discussion on achieving Nash implementation. Nash implementation requires that the transactions obtained at all NE must be optimal centralized solutions (solutions to Problem (P C )). To see how the proposed game form leads to this property, we first discuss how this game form obtains feasbile solutions of (P C ) at all NE. Using the property of NE we then argue that the feasible solutions obtained by the game form must be optimal solutions to (P C ).
To see the feasibility of NE transactions, let us intuitively discuss equation (19) which determines the supply vector of suppliers. Note from (19) that the quantity of each product supplied by supplier i equals the average demand per supplier for that product (the third term in (19)), plus an increment equal to the difference between the supply proposal of supplier i and the average supply proposal of other suppliers for the same product (first and second terms in (19)). Thus, supplier i's message x i can be interpreted as the supply proposal that makes its net supplyx i (m) match its desired value through appropriate adjustment of the abovementioned increment. Here, the desired value ofx i (m) means one that lies within D (20) with (19) it can be seen that the purchase vectors are determined from manufacturers' messages in a similar way as the supply vectors are determined from suppliers' messages. Therefore, as discussed in the previous paragraph, through an appropriate purchase proposal in R L each manufacturer (19) and (20) that for all message profiles, the net product transfer from the suppliers to manufacturers is balanced, i.e.x i (m), i ∈ N S , andŷ j (m), j ∈ N M , satisfy the product balance condition (5). Since this condition is satisfied for all message profiles, it is also satisfied at all NE.
Having intuitively discussed the properties of supply-purchase vectors at NE, to establish that the NE transactions are feasible it remains to show the following: (i) the individual payments,
, are all non-negative; and (ii) the payment vectors satisfy the budget balance condition (4). To establish these properties let us intuitively discuss the payment function (21) (the analysis of (23) 
This common price proposal p * can be interpreted as the competitive price of the L products at which the transaction is agreed upon.
Because of the abovementioned NE strategy, the penalty terms vanish from the firms' payments at NE. Therefore, the NE payment of the firms isr i (m
is an average of the non-negative price proposals of firms other than supplier i, andx i (m * ) is a non-negative supply vector in D S i as discussed before. Similarly, the NE paymentĝ j (m * ) of each manufacturer j ∈ N M must also be non-negative.
This establishes property (i) of the two properties that were required to show the feasibility of NE payments. To establish property (ii), note from above that for each of the L products, the NE price of the product is the same for all firms. Therefore, the NE payment, p * Tx i (m * ) for supplier i ∈ N S , and p * Tŷ j (m * ) for manufacturer j ∈ N M , is proportional to the supply/purchase of the respective supplier/manufacturer. Because the product transfer from suppliers to manufacturers is balanced at all NE (established earlier), by above arguments the net money transfer from manufacturers to suppliers must also be balanced at NE. This establishes property (ii) of the NE payments and hence, the feasibility of NE transaction.
We now argue that the feasible NE transactions are in fact optimal solutions of Problem (P C ).
As shown above, the NE payment for supplier i, i ∈ N S , is p
is not controlled by supplier i's own message, the only way supplier i can influence its NE utility is through the allocationx i (m * ). In other words, supplier i must behave as a price taker at NE, and given the NE price p
, it must choose a strategy (message) so as to control its NE allocationx i (m * ) and maximize its own utility. Because supplier i has the flexibility to submit any supply proposal in R L , for any given price p
brings its allocationx i (m * ) to a value that maximizes its utility at price p S −i (m * ). Note from (19) that if supplier i's supply proposal for some product is higher than the average supply proposal for the same product by other suppliers, then supplier i supplies more (positive increment) than the average demand per supplier for that product and vice versa. This allows the individual incentives of suppliers to be aligned with the system objective. Similarly, each manufacturer j ∈ N M can also choose a message that maximizes its utility given its NE price p M −j (m * ). Because at all NE the price of a given product is the same for all the firms, the abovementioned individual utility maximization of each firm at the common NE price leads to the maximization of the system objective function at NE.
Following the above argument it can also be seen that at all NE, each supplier and manufacturer can guarantee a non-negative utility for itself. This is because under any situation, each firm can unilaterally change its message (supply/purchase proposal and price proposal) so as to: (i) make its allocated supply/purchase quantity equal to zero; and (ii) make its payment penalty equal to zero.
Such a message would also make the firm's payment and hence its utility equal to zero because in Sharma et al.: Nash implementation of optimal trade in a supply-chain Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
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the absence of payment penalty, the payment of each firm is proportional to its supply/purchase quantity. Thus each firm can obtain zero utility by unilaterally changing its message. Therefore, for a message profile to be a NE, it must provide each firm a non-negative utility, and this makes the game form individually rational.
In the next section we present theorems that formalize all the above intuitive arguments.
Optimality of the game form
The main results of this paper are summarized by Theorems 1 and 2, which assert that the game form proposed in Section 3.2 achieves the goal stated in Section 3.1.
Theorem 1 Let m * be a NE of the game induced by the game form presented in Section 3.2 and the firms' utility functions (6) and (7). Let (ĝ(m * ),r(m * ),x(m * ),ŷ(m * )) =: (ĝ * ,r * ,x * ,ŷ * ) be the transaction at m * determined by the game form. Then, (a) All firms weakly prefer (ĝ * ,r * ,x * ,ŷ * ) to the initial allocation (0, 0, 0, 0). Mathematically,
is an optimal solution of the centralized problem (P C ).
Furthermore, all NE of the game result in the same optimal transaction vector, i.e., if m is any
Theorem 2 Let (x * ,ŷ * ) be the optimum supply and purchase vector for Problem (P C ). Then, (a) There exists a price vectorp * such that,
(b) There exists at least one NE m * of the game induced by the game form of Section 3.2 and the firms' utilities specified by (6) and (7) such that, (x(m * ),ŷ(m * )) = (x * ,ŷ * ). Furthermore, Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
ized by the solution of the following set of equations:
Because Theorem 1 is stated for an arbitrary NE m * of the game induced by the game form presented in Section 3.2 and the firms' utility functions (6) and (7), the assertion of the theorem holds for all NE of this game. Thus, part (a) of Theorem 1 establishes the individual rationality property of the game form presented in Section 3.2.
Part (b) of Theorem 1 asserts that all NE of the game induced by the game form presented in Section 3.2 and the firms' utility functions (6) and (7) result in optimal centralized transactions (solutions of Problem (P C )). Thus, the set of NE transactions is a subset of the set of optimal centralized transactions. This establishes that the game form presented in Section 3.2 implements in NE the goal correspondence π defined by Problem (P C ) (see Section 3.1). Because of this property, the game form guarantees to provide an optimal centralized transaction irrespectively of which NE is achieved in the game induced by the game form.
The assertion of Theorem 1 that establishes the above two properties of the game form is based on the assumption that there exists a NE of the game induced by the game form of Section 3.2 and the firms' utility functions (6) and (7). However, Theorem 1 does not say anything about the existence of NE. Theorem 2 proves that NE exist in the above game, and provides conditions that characterize the set of all NE that result in optimal centralized transactions of the
, where (x * ,ŷ * ) is the optimal centralized supply-purchase vector.
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Conclusion
We constructed a decentralized mechanism for supply-chain coordination. The mechanism leads to a game among suppliers and manufacturers, all Nash Equilibria of which result in production decisions that are optimal for the corresponding centralized supply chain system. Our results apply to general multi-product procurement problems where all firms behave selfishly, possess private information about both their production capabilities (expressed as linear constraints) as well as their objective functions (general concave utility functions), and do not share common beliefs about the private information of other firms. In fact, unlike the canonical contract theory approach (Laffont and Martimort (2002) ) which is based on the Bayesian Equilibrium concept, we make no a priori assumptions on the beliefs of any of the participants. Thus, our approach is an appealing modeling framework for describing complex supply chain systems, where common beliefs assumptions are not always justifiable or where specifying a priori beliefs might be difficult.
In our mechanism, the buyers and sellers in the supply chain submit bids/offers for the quantities they would like to buy/sell and the prices they would like other buyers/sellers to pay/receive per unit of each product. We provide rules for allocating orders and determining payments based on the bids/offers. We show that, in equilibrium, the unit price received by all the firms supplying a particular product is equal to the unit price paid by all the firms buying that product. One could interpret this price as the clearing price for the product in the internal market among firms or among divisions of the same firm. Unlike prior work on coordinating firm's production and sales decisions through internal markets, our model does not require a centralized planner to set the prices in the internal markets. Instead, the clearing prices are part of the equilibrium outcome.
Our results are very general, so a number of assumptions were necessary. Our model would not apply to a simple supply chain with a single buyer and single seller. In order for the proposed mechanism to work, the system must have at least two buyers or at least two sellers. We believe this is not a restrictive assumption for many real procurement situations, because several suppliers are likely to offer their products and several buyers are likely to place bids with the suppliers. In our Sharma et al.: Nash implementation of optimal trade in a supply-chain
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model, we focused on a one-time exchange of goods and money between the buyers and the sellers.
Therefore, there is no possibility of observing random events and sequential contracting based upon the outcomes of those events. Similarly, we do not allow contracts that are contingent on the realization of any random variables. This might be restrictive in some cases, for example, when suppliers might want to take an "equity" position in the buyer's sales, and receive payments for the products based on the realized buyer demand. However, this is also a strength of our model, because the buyer's demand might not be contractible, or even observable in many practical settings. The models with sequential contracting and contingent contracts have important applications, but the theory to handle these features under asymmetric information is still under development. We defer the analysis of such models to future research. Finally, the approach presented in this paper is a constructive one which proves the existence of a decentralized mechanism and a resulting game such that all its Nash equilibria lead to optimal trade of products. We do not have an algorithm for the computation of these equilibria. For our problem, orthogonal search algorithms do not guarantee convergence to Nash equilibria because the games corresponding to the proposed game Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
In this section we present the proof of Theorem 1. We divide the proof into several claims to organize the presentation. Throughout the proof, we represent the NE allocations as follows for simplicity of notation:
Claim 1 If m * is a NE of the game specified by the game form presented in Section 3.2 and the firms' utility functions (6) and (7), then, the NE paymentsr * i to the suppliers i ∈ N S are of the form,r *
Tx * i , and the NE paymentsĝ * j by the manufacturers j ∈ N M are of the form,
Proof:
Let m * be a NE described in Claim 1. Then, for each i ∈ N S ,
Substituting m in (30) and using (19) implies that,
Since u S i is increasing in r i (see (6)), (31) implies that,
Substituting (21) in (32) implies that,
Since (33) must hold for all p S i ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N S , it implies that, Sharma et al.: Nash implementation of optimal trade in a supply-chain Article submitted to Operations Research; manuscript no.
or (N
Following the same steps as in (30)- (34) and using the manufacturers' utilities u
It follows from (34) and (35) that at any NE m * ,
Substituting (36) in (21) we obtain that the NE payment to the suppliers must be of the form
Similarly, substituting (36) in (23) we obtain that the NE payment by the manufacturers must be of the formĝ *
Claim 2 If m * is a NE of the game specified by the game form presented in Section 3.2 and the firms' utility functions (6) and (7), then the allocation (ĝ * ,r
Proof:
By the design of the outcome function (20),
Since (39) holds for all messages m ∈ M, it also holds for the NE m * . 7 Furthermore, Claim 1 implies that
The second equality in (40) follows from the fact that at NE m * , p
The last equality in (40) follows from (39).
We complete the proof of the claim by contradiction as follows. Suppose that the NE transaction
The construction of m S i implies that
and (41) and (42) imply that
Thus supplier i will find it profitable to deviate to m S i . This means that m * is not a NE which is a contradiction. Therefore we must have that for each i ∈ N S , (r *
Next suppose that the NE purchaseŷ *
The construction of m M j implies that and (44) and (45) imply that
Thus manufacturer j will find it profitable to deviate to m M j . This means that m * is not a NE which is a contradiction. Therefore we must have that for each j ∈ N M ,ŷ * j ∈ D M j , i.e.ŷ * j ≥ 0. With the result of Claim 1 it also implies that
It follows from contradictions (43), (46) and relations (47), (39) and (40) that the NE transaction
Claim 3 The game form presented in Section 3.2 is individually rational, i.e., if m * is a NE of the game induced by this game form and the firms' utility functions (6) and (7), then, the NE allocation (ĝ * ,r * ,x * ,ŷ * ) is preferred by each firm over its initial allocation. Mathematically,
Proof:
From Claim 1 we know the form of NE payment. Substituting that from (37) into (30) we obtain sthat for each i ∈ N S ,
In particular, choosing m (21) and (19), and using (34) we obtain
Since (50) is satisfied for anyx i ∈ R L , lettingx i = 0 we get from (50) that
For j ∈ N M we have
In particular, choosing m (52) from (23) and (20), and using (35) we obtain
Substituting
Forŷ j = 0, (54) implies that
and (51) and (55) together complete the proof of Claim 3.
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Claim 4 A NE transaction (ĝ * ,r * ,x * ,ŷ * ) is an optimal solution of the centralized problem (P C ).
Proof:
From (50) we have that, for each i ∈ N S ,
By Assumption 2 the objective function in (56) is concave. Therefore, KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient forx * i to be the maximizer in (56). The KKT condition for (56) says that, ∃ λ
From (54) we also have that, for each j ∈ N M ,
Since v j is concave, KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient forŷ * j to be the maximizer in (62). The KKT condition for (62) says that
Let us now analyze the solution of Problem (P C ). Since c i , i ∈ N S , are convex, and v j , j ∈ N M , are concave, and D is a compact set, Problem (P C ) has a unique solution in (x, y) which is characterized
by the KKT conditions. The solution in (g, r) on the other hand trivially exists. Re-writing the optimization problem (P C ) only for (x, y) we have
Suppose (x * ,ŷ * ) is the optimal transaction corresponding to Problem (P C ). Then, (x * ,ŷ * ) along with some λ
+ , j ∈ N M , and µ ∈ R L must satisfy the KKT conditions given below:
(λ (57)- (61) and (63)- (65) imply (68) 
all the feasibility conditions of Problem (P C ) are satisfied by the NE transaction (ĝ * ,r * ,x * ,ŷ * ).
This proves that the NE transaction is an optimum solution of the centralized problem (P C ).
Since the NE m * we analyzed in Claims 1-4 was arbitrarily chosen, the results of Claims 1-4
hold true for all NE of the game induced by the game form of Section 3.2 and the firms' utilities (6) and (7). Therefore, all NE corresponding to the aforementioned game form result in an optimal solution of Problem (P C ). Furthermore, since Problem (P C ) has a unique solution in (x, y), all NE result in the same optimal supply and purchase vectors, i.e., if m is a NE other than m * , then,
x(m) =x(m * ) andŷ(m) =ŷ(m * ). This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 shows that if there exists a NE of the game induced by the game form of Section 3.2, then the transaction at the NE is an optimum centralized transaction (optimum solution of Problem (P C )). However, Theorem 1 does not guarantee the existence of a NE; in other words, it does not guarantee that the optimum centralized transaction is attainable through NE. This is guaranteed by Theorem 2 which is proved next.
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 2
We prove Theorem 2 in two steps. In the first step we show that there exists a price vector such that when the suppliers and manufacturers individually maximize their respective utilities taking this price as given, they obtain as their optima the optimal centralized supply and purchase vectorsx * i , i ∈ N S , andŷ * j , j ∈ N M . In the second step of the proof we show that the above price vector and the optimum supply and purchase vector (x * ,ŷ * ) can be used to construct message profiles that are NE of the game induced by the game form of Section 3.2 and the firms' utility functions (6) and (7).
Claim 5 If (x * ,ŷ * ) is an optimal solution of Problem (P C ), there exists a price vectorp * such that,
∀ j ∈ N M ,ŷ * j = arg max
As mentioned in the proof of Claim 4, Problem (P C ) has a unique solution in (x, y) since it involves maximization of a concave function in (x, y) over a compact set D in (x, y). Suppose (x * ,ŷ * ) is the optimal transaction corresponding to Problem (P C ). Then it must satisfy the KKT conditions. KKT conditions imply that there exist λ
j ∈ N M , and µ ∈ R L such that these parameters along with (x * ,ŷ * ) satisfy (68)- (76). From (69) it can be seen that only µ ≤ 0 can satisfy the equality since ∇ŷ j v j (ŷ j ) |ŷ j =ŷ * 
From (82) we have that, p S −i (m * ) = p S i * =p * ∀ i ∈ N S . Therefore, (84) also implies that (x * i , p S i * ) = arg max
Next, we can equivalently write (79) as,
